particular those with distributed topologies, where the interconnection of different elements (agents) leads to a global behavior that depends on the local interaction of these agents. Applications such as games played on networks, the dynamics of consensus/synchronization, and energy and transportation networks combine many techniques of game theory, such as noncooperative, cooperative, dynamical, mean-field theory, and evolutionary games. Because of this rising recent interest, this special issue is devoted to collecting different techniques and points of view in the interaction of game-theoretical methods and automatic control, with the aim of closing the gap between the wide background in game theory and related disciplines and their application to solving engineering problems of diverse nature.
TEChNICAL CONCERNS
The key motivation for organizing this special issue was the constant search for bridges between people with different but complementary research backgrounds (game theory and automatic control) but sharing the same objective: efficiently solving real control problems involving largescale systems with complex dynamics. With that objective, several nontrivial but motivational questions arise, such as the following: 1) Why is it important to use game-theoretical methods in automatic control problems? 2) What are the main advantages/disadvantages of using these techniques compared to other classical and modern methods? 3) Is there a general methodology that can be followed to use game-theoretical methods in dynamic resource-allocation problems? 4) What are the main research challenges in control sys tems that can be solved using game-theoretical methods? 5) What are (some of) the real applications involving automatic control that use techniques such as noncooperative, cooperative, and evolutionary game theory? The articles in this issue relate to control algorithms based on game theory, population dynamics, evolutionary game theory, coalitional control, distributed control, and social integration of engineering problems. All articles address different aspects of the proposed research questions using different methodologies and case studies, enabling the reader to see the relationships among the disciplines involved. Although the articles in this issue already treat several topics related to game theory and control, much more work is required to discover all of the advantages and strengths of applying game theory to real control problems. The hope is that this special issue encourages researchers worldwide to explore this novel line of research, leading to further successful results.
CONTRIbuTIONS Of ThE SpECIAL ISSuE
This issue contains four research articles focused on presenting or proposing methodologies for learning in games, coalitional games, population/evolutionary games, and networked resource-allocation problems. Each article provides an introduction to the methodologies and presents the analogies necessary to understand how these problems are related to the control systems area. Examples based on dynamical and control systems are presented to clarify the utility of the proposed techniques.
The articles all address motivational question 5 since they demonstrate and discuss the effectiveness of the application of their proposed approaches over case studies that reflect real engineering problems: smart energy grids, lighting systems, traffic routing networks, and urban drainage systems. Except for the last article, all cover the discussions raised from motivational questions 2 and 4 since they propose the design of distributed control topologies different to those reported in the literature so far, given their flexibility and the scalability of their control architecture, being capable of arranging themselves into proper subsystems as a function of their needs and without a supervisory control layer.
The special issue starts with "Game Theory-Based Control System Algorithms with Real-Time Reinforcement Learning" by Vamvoudakis, Modares, Kiumarsi, and Lewis, which addresses motivational questions 1, 2, and 4. This article presents and discusses how to solve online multiplayer game problems by using adaptive learning in real time based on data taken from the players. The approach assumes that the players communicate using a graph network topology, only receiving information along the graph edges. The considered methods use reinforcement learning (RL), in particular the off-policy RL, to learn, online and in real time, the solution to both zero-sum and nonzero sum Nash games. Hence, the proposed approach solves the online multiplayer game to achieve both optimal regulation and optimal control tasks using data measured along the trajectories of the players. The article considers the complete knowledge of the agent's state, leaving, for further work, research on the design of output-feedback controllers based only on measured output data. The concepts of the article are demonstrated on networked cyberphysical systems.
The next article, by Felle, Maestre, and Camacho, "Coalitional Control: Cooperative Game Theory and Control," provides a summary of the fundamental concepts of coalitional game theory, in particular those concepts related to control engineering applications. Drawing from the well-established framework of the control of largescale systems, a brief literature survey traces an ideal path from the optimal model partitioning to the distributed control schemes whose principles happen to be close to the idea of coalitional control. The article is framed within this novel theory that emerges by seeking solutions in the multiagent framework formulated into the game-theory context, which helps to deal with different issues, located at a higher layer in the management of large-scale systems. To illustrate the coalitional control algorithm, the authors consider a demand-response problem framed within the large-scale systems problem of a smart grid. The article deals especially with motivational questions 2 and 4 and also with question 1, since game theory is the branch of mathematics involved with mutual-interaction problems, which is often the case in distributed control problems. The local controllers or agents can be independent entities with their own goals and may not have an incentive for cooperation unless they can obtain some benefit. Regarding motivational questions 2 and 4, cooperative game theory establishes the essential conditions for cooperation among local controllers and to distribute the corresponding benefits and costs.
"The Role of Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics in Distributed Control Systems," by Quijano, Ocampo-Martinez, Barreiro-Gomez, Obando, Pantoja, and Mojica-Nava, uses a multiagent system framework, which may be cast in game-theoretic terms, to perform the distributed control of large-scale complex systems in which the availability of information plays a crucial role. Some of these problems can be seen as dynamic resource-allocation problems, which can be solved using dynamic games. In these types of games, there is a learning mechanism that helps to modify past decisions using a model of the environment, the objectives that are pursued, and the order and amount of information needed to modify the actions. In this article, a special class of dynamic games that describe the change of behavior of the players is used: evolutionary game theory (EGT). Even though this EGT approach has been widely studied in biology and behavioral ecology, the authors use the fact that there is an analogy between the evolution of the behavior of agents and the population games to design controllers for different dynamic resourceallocation problems. This article presents a useful mathematical formalism of the population games and evolutionary dynamics and their main features and properties to address the motivational questions 1, 3, and 4. To show the effectiveness of the proposed approaches, simulation and/or implementation results from three real engineering applications are presented.
Adding a complementary perspective to the game-theory-based control statements, the article by Brown and Marden, "Studies on Robust Social Influence Mechanisms," addresses the way engineering problems are embedded in a social environment and how the strategic behavior from system users affects its performance. The discussion arises from the fact that the incentives of the users as individuals may be against the global objectives of the entire system. The main question this article seeks to resolve is how behavior-influencing mechanisms can be designed to be robust to a variety of mischaracterization/ variations in models of social behavior. The proposed approach, through a traffic-routing case study, investigates the definition of robust social influence, providing analytical results that can be applied to engineering systems that are enmeshed with social systems. This article tackles motivational questions 3 and 4 since, apart from covering the problem from a nominal point of view, the proposed approach discusses the robustness in the performance of the engineering problems in a social framework, which is, in general, one of the most interesting challenging issue in the analysis of control systems.
